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HOW THE SPENDING CLAUSE CAN SOLVE
THE DILEMMA OF STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY FROM INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SUITS
JENNIFER COTNER
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court held in two cases, Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank (“Florida Prepaid”)1 and College Savings Bank v. Florida Pre-
paid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (“College Savings
Bank”),2 that states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from patent and
trademark infringement suits was not waived or properly abrogated
by Congress.3 After these decisions were handed down, Congress al-
most immediately announced hearings to determine what kind of
legislation could sidestep these holdings.4 Congress realized that al-
lowing states to have immunity from intellectual property infringe-
ment actions could have devastating effects on the intellectual prop-
erty system. The former Register of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer,
Copyright © 2001 by Jennifer Cotner.
1. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
2. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
3. While the Supreme Court has not decided the question specifically, there is every rea-
son to believe that copyright infringement actions would be subject to the same fate. After
Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, the Fifth Circuit held that states were immune from
copyright infringement actions in Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 607 (2000).
4. State Sovereign Immunity and Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 1 (2000) (statements of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights; Daniel J. Meltzer, Pro-
fessor of Law, Harvard Law School; Mark A. Lemley, Professor of Law, University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley; Howard Coble, Chair, House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property)
[hereinafter Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity]; 145 CONG. REC. S10359 (daily ed. Aug. 5,
1999) (statement of Sen. Specter).
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testified before Congress over ten years ago to the breadth of state
usage of copyrighted materials:
States and their instrumentalities are major users of copyrighted ma-
terial of all sorts—not only the familiar forms of printed books and
periodicals but the whole range of creative expression . . . dance and
drama, music and sound recordings; photographs and filmstrips; mo-
tion pictures and video recordings; computer software and chips;
pictorial and graphic material, maps and architectural plans, and so
forth, ad infinitum. State exploitation of copyrighted works is by no
means limited to uses that can be called educational or nonprofit.
They include large publishing enterprises, computer networks, off-
air taping, public performance and display, radio and television
broadcasting, and cable transmissions, to name only the most obvi-
ous.5
After Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, states are free in es-
sence to exploit these kinds of materials anytime they wish. The in-
tellectual property issue is a pressing one, and Congress must act to
remedy the situation immediately.6
Following a brief discussion of the legal background, this Note
explores the alternatives presently open to Congress and concludes
that Congress’s best option is to pass a measure that would condition
the states’ receipt of federal intellectual property rights on their
waiver of immunity in infringement actions against them. This “condi-
tional waiver” proposal would encourage individual states to waive
their sovereign immunity voluntarily. Under this system, no state
would be able to acquire a federal intellectual property right unless it
agreed to waive its sovereign immunity from future intellectual prop-
erty suits.
Two recent articles suggest that this kind of bill would not be
constitutional in light of recent Supreme Court decisions that have
expanded the state governments’ power at the expense of the federal
government.7 However, as this Note demonstrates, the conditional
5. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act: Hearings on H.R. 1131 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 93 (1989) (statement of Barbara Ringer, Former Register of Copyrights).
6. See, e.g., Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 24 (statement of
Marybeth Peters) (“[I]t is important that. . . . [Congress] decides to redress the imbalance cre-
ated by the recent decisions of the Supreme Court. . . . Let me make it clear that I believe Con-
gress should act.”).
7. Mitchell N. Berman et al., State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property
Rights: How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1147, 1151–55
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waiver bill has the best chance of passing constitutional muster. It will
be the most effective means to accomplish Congress’s goal—to make
states responsible for their acts of infringement just like everyone
else.8
I.  THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ITS LOOPHOLES
The Eleventh Amendment states, “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”9 The Supreme Court effectively has extended the breadth of
(2001) (arguing that a conditional waiver scheme such as this one would fail under the normal
test, pronounced by Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Dole, and under a Nollan/Dolan–type
test like that used in Fifth Amendment exactions cases); John T. Cross, Suing the States for
Copyright Infringement, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 337, 386 (2000) (arguing that a conditional waiver
plan would be unconstitutional because it imposes an unconstitutional condition on the states).
In addition to the cases mentioned infra Part II, the Supreme Court has curtailed con-
gressional power in several other areas. For instance, in 1995, it set limits on Congress’s power
to legislate under the Interstate Commerce Clause. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
At one point, the Supreme Court looked for only a reasonable and legitimate connection be-
tween legislation enacted under the Interstate Commerce Clause and the ends desired, and ex-
hibited extreme deference to congressional findings. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act as valid under the Commerce Clause because coal moves in interstate commerce
and mining influences other resources that affect interstate commerce); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183, 185–88 (1968) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act, which expanded minimum
wage and maximum hours coverage of employees engaged in interstate commerce). Lopez re-
quires a tighter fit between means and ends and a substantial nexus between the regulated ac-
tivity and interstate commerce. See 514 U.S. at 559. The Rehnquist Court also has seriously lim-
ited the power of Congress to regulate the states directly. Congress may not “commandeer”
state regulatory agencies and legislatures by forcing them to regulate on behalf of Congress.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168
(1992).
8. For an example of the type of bill this Note proposes, see Senate Bill 1835, introduced
by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT). S. 1835, 106th Cong. (1999). Senator Leahy introduced this
legislation less than six months after the Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank decisions
were handed down. S. 1835 also contains a Fourteenth Amendment abrogation proposal that is
extremely questionable as an effective means of subjecting states to liability for their acts of in-
fringement. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This amendment effectively overruled Chisholm v. Georgia, in
which the Supreme Court had held that a state could be sued by a citizen of another state in
federal court. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 479–80 (1793). Justice Iredell’s dissent in that case provided
the blueprint for the Eleventh Amendment. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Iredell reasoned that in light of the limits on federal court juris-
diction set out in the Judiciary Act (that it should accord with “the principles and usages of
law”), federal jurisdiction should be interpreted in light of prevailing common law, which en-
compassed the sovereign immunity doctrine. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 434–46 (Iredell, J.,
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the amendment, holding that States are protected not only from suits
initiated by citizens of other states, but also from suits by citizens of
the defendant state in federal court.10
Presently, a potential plaintiff may circumvent the Eleventh
Amendment using only three mechanisms.11 The plaintiff may argue
that the state waived its immunity;12 that Congress abrogated the
state’s sovereign immunity; or that a state official may be sued under
the Ex Parte Young doctrine.13 To subject states to intellectual prop-
erty lawsuits, Congress must use one of these mechanisms.
To determine whether Congress validly has abrogated state
sovereign immunity, a court asks “whether Congress has ‘unequivo-
cally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity’. . . and second,
whether Congress has acted ‘pursuant to a valid exercise of power.’”14
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity only by using
its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,15 or (probably) any other post–Eleventh Amendment enforce-
ment power.16 The strict test announced in City of Boerne v. Flo-
dissenting). He concluded that the language of Article III of the United States Constitution did
not change the common law. Id.
10. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). The holding in Hans has been criticized by
many observers, including Supreme Court Justices, into very recent times. For instance, Justice
Stevens has argued that there are in reality two Eleventh Amendments, the one ratified in 1795
and the other invented by the Supreme Court in Hans. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1, 23 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Souter also has expressed his belief, along with Jus-
tices Ginsburg and Breyer, that the court in Hans misread the Eleventh Amendment. Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting).
11. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 389 (3d ed. 1999).
12. The Register of Copyrights, however, in her testimony before Congress, cited a Con-
gressional Research Service report appended to the 1988 Copyright Office study called “Copy-
right Liability of States and the Eleventh Amendment” that demonstrated few states have
waived their immunity from copyright infringement suits in federal court. Hearings on State
Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 23 (statement of Marybeth Peters).
13. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 389; Nathan C. Thomas, Note, The Withering Doc-
trine of Ex Parte Young, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1068, 1076 (1998). The Ex Parte Young doctrine
is discussed infra notes 51–59 and accompanying text.
14. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
15. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636–37
(1999); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73. The Court held that Congress may abrogate state immu-
nity by using Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an award of attorney’s fees against a
state in a case brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because that Act was enacted under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
16. In Seminole Tribe, the Court settled that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign
immunity using its Article I powers. 517 U.S. at 73. However, the Fourteenth Amendment is
special; it was enacted after the Eleventh Amendment. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
COTNER.DOC 01/25/02  3:22 PM
2001] STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 717
res17 for whether a particular act of Congress is properly grounded in
the Fourteenth Amendment is whether there is “a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end.”18
Even if Congress did not abrogate state sovereign immunity, a
state still may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit.19
That waiver must be voluntary, however,20 and the test for determin-
ing whether a state has waived its immunity voluntarily is a stringent
one.21 Courts find a waiver only when the state voluntarily invokes
federal court jurisdiction,22 or makes a “clear declaration” or an
“unequivocal expression” that it intends to consent to federal court
jurisdiction.23
II.  FLORIDA PREPAID AND COLLEGE SAVINGS BANK
This Part explores the Supreme Court’s decisions in Florida Pre-
paid and College Savings Bank, in which the Court held that Congress
may not abrogate state sovereign immunity in patent and trademark
infringement cases, respectively. The parties were the same in each
case. College Savings Bank, a private New Jersey bank, developed
and sold patented certificates of deposit, which were annuity con-
tracts designed to guarantee investors returns sufficient to fund col-
unlike Article I, gives Congress authority to restrict state power when it infringes on the guaran-
tees provided by that Amendment. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
17. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
18. Id. at 520. Congress has the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment but not to determine what a constitutional violation is. Id. at 519. The Court has
long acknowledged that Congress’s power under Section 5 is remedial, not substantive. Id. at
520; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966). Congress may use its Section 5
power to enforce existing constitutional violations, but it may not use this power to define new
constitutional violations. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. It must specifically identify conduct
violating the Fourteenth Amendment and narrowly tailor its statute to remedy such conduct. Id.
19. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
20. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675
(1999) (citing Beers ex rel. Platenius v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858)).
21. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).
22. Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906).
23. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); Great N. Life Ins.
Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944). A state does not waive its immunity to suit in federal court
by consenting to suit in state court, Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441–45 (1900), by stating a
general intent “to sue or be sued,” Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home
Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 149–50 (1981) (per curiam), or by generally authorizing suit “in any court of
competent jurisdiction,” Entergy, Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U.S. 573, 578 (1946)).
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lege tuition.24 The Florida Prepaid Board was a state entity that pro-
vided an identical annuity contract.25 
In Florida Prepaid, College Savings Bank initiated a patent in-
fringement action against Florida Prepaid for its use of College Sav-
ings Bank’s annuity contract.26 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
after the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit af-
firmed the trial court’s holding. The trial court had determined that
Florida Prepaid was not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment for the alleged patent infringement because Congress
had properly abrogated its immunity using its power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.27
The Supreme Court found first that the Patent Remedy Act
clearly expressed Congress’s intent to abrogate state sovereign im-
munity in patent infringement actions.28 Next, the Court considered
whether Congress acted legitimately pursuant to an enumerated
power.29 The legislative history demonstrated that Congress justified
the Patent Remedy Act with three constitutional provisions: the Pat-
ent Clause,30 the Interstate Commerce Clause,31 and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.32 The Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida
held that Article I is not a valid basis for abrogating state sovereign
immunity.33 Following this line of reasoning, the Florida Prepaid
Court concluded that Seminole Tribe effectively barred the first two
sources as legitimate justifications for the Patent Remedy Act, be-
cause they depended on constitutional powers created before the
Eleventh Amendment was enacted.34
24. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630–31
(1999).
25. Id. at 631.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 634.
28. Id. at 635.
29. Id. at 635–36.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
32. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635–36.
33. See 517 U.S. 44, 65–73 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989), and holding that the Eleventh Amendment restricts judicial power under Article III and
that Article I cannot be used to circumvent constitutional limits placed on federal jurisdiction).
34. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636 (“Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers . . . .”). The Patent Remedy
Act was passed before the decision in Seminole Tribe was handed down. Patent and Plant Vari-
ety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994)).
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Even though the Court affirmed that Congress validly may abro-
gate state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and that patents are a cognizable form of property under
the Fourteenth Amendment, it held that the Patent Remedy Act was
not a valid exercise of this congressional power.35 It failed to satisfy
the congruence and proportionality test established in City of Boerne
v. Flores.36
According to the Court, the legislative record of the Patent
Remedy Act did not demonstrate that Congress intended to remedy a
specific Fourteenth Amendment violation.37 A constitutional violation
occurs only when the state provides inadequate remedies when it in-
fringes on patent owners’ property rights without due process.38 The
Act did not respond to a history of widespread deprivations of due
process rights or target a specific constitutional wrong, as City of
Boerne required.39 The Court also held that the Act’s reach was dis-
proportional to the wrong to be remedied because it was a blanket re-
sponse instead of one tailored to the worst types of infringement or
the worst state offenders.40
In College Savings Bank,41 the plaintiff bank filed a false adver-
tising and unfair competition suit under the Lanham Act and alleged
that the defendant state agency made misstatements about its tuition
savings program in its brochures and annual reports.42 The Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari after the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of the bank’s Lanham Act suit against the
state agency.43 Both lower courts had rejected the bank’s arguments
that Florida Prepaid’s immunity had been waived or abrogated.44
The Court considered whether one of the two recognized cir-
cumstances in which a state may be subjected to suit existed: had
Congress abrogated the state’s immunity under Section 5 of the Four-
35. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642, 647.
36. See id. at 645–46 (ruling that the Patent Remedy Act’s provisions were too far out of
proportion to a supposed remedial objective to have been designed to prevent unconstitutional
behavior).
37. Id. at 643–44.
38. Id. at 643.
39. Id. at 645–46.
40. See id. at 646–47 (noting that Congress did nothing to limit the Act’s broad coverage).
  41. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
42. Id. at 671.
43. Id. at 671–72.
44. Id. at 672.
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teenth Amendment, or had the state waived immunity by consenting
to suit?45 The Court concluded that Congress did not successfully ab-
rogate the state’s immunity.46 It did not even reach the City of Boerne
test here, because it held that the right to be free from a competitor’s
false advertising was not a property right under the Fourteenth
Amendment;47 therefore, the government could not have deprived the
bank of its property rights without due process.
Next, the Court concluded that Florida Prepaid did not expressly
consent to this suit in federal court or voluntarily invoke federal court
jurisdiction.48 College Savings Bank contended that Florida Prepaid
impliedly or constructively waived its immunity per the doctrine set
out in Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks Depart-
ment.49 The Court rejected this reasoning and expressly overruled
Parden, holding that a state’s waiver of sovereign immunity must be
express, unequivocal, and voluntary.50
III.  POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL ALTERNATIVES
As mentioned above, the Florida Prepaid and College Savings
Bank decisions have left victims of patent, trademark, and presuma-
bly copyright infringement with very limited remedies against the
state. Section A discusses how the options presently available to these
victims are wholly inadequate. Section B discusses the Spending
Clause options, including the conditional waiver scheme that this
Note proposes is the best solution available to Congress. Finally, Sec-
tion C discusses other congressional alternatives and explains why
they are less satisfactory than the conditional waiver plan.
45. See id. at 670 (recognizing these circumstances as the only two in which an individual
can sue a state).
46. Id. at 675.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 676.
49. 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964), discussed in Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676. Parden stood for
the proposition that a state constructively may waive its sovereign immunity by engaging in
commerce among the states. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 191–92 (holding that FELA abrogated a
state-owned railroad’s sovereign immunity). The Parden Court reasoned that the states surren-
dered a portion of their sovereign immunity when they gave Congress the power to regulate in-
terstate commerce and participated in that commerce. Id.
50. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680–81.
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A. Current Mechanisms to Sidestep Florida Prepaid and College
Savings Bank
The only option left for victims of state intellectual property in-
fringement is to sue state officials under the Ex Parte Young51 doc-
trine. This doctrine is the primary means to assert claims against the
state; it permits individuals to initiate suits against state officers in-
stead of against the state itself.52 Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 per-
mits suits against state officers in their personal capacities.53 If the of-
ficials were held liable for damages and completely indemnified, this
system could operate in a similar fashion to direct governmental li-
ability.54 However, such lawsuits would not adequately meet the needs
of victims of intellectual property infringement, because victims of in-
fringement are entitled only to prospective, injunctive relief against
state officials.55 Therefore, if the infringement has already occurred
and the monetary loss was significant, the victim would have no rem-
edy for its injuries.
Another problem with the current system is that many state offi-
cials enjoy qualified immunity from suit. Ex Parte Young provides
that a citizen may sue a state official for damages only for actions that
are outside the scope of his duties.56 It also can be very difficult to de-
termine which official is the proper defendant in the infringement
suit.57 Professor Daniel J. Meltzer recently told the Senate Judiciary
Committee that “juries may hesitate to award adequate damages
against individual officers serving the public under often difficult
conditions.”58 A system that allows for only partial or no relief for in-
tellectual property infringement is inadequate.59
51. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
52. Thomas, supra note 13, at 1100.
53. See Hafer v. Malo, 502 U.S. 21, 29–30 (1991) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not
erect a barrier against suits to impose ‘individual and personal liability’ on state officials under
§ 1983.”).
54. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 44 (statement of Daniel Melt-
zer).
55. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664–66 (1974) (placing limits on the injunctive
relief available under the Ex Parte Young doctrine).
56. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 23 (statement of Marybeth Pe-
ters).
57. See id. at 44 (statement of Daniel J. Meltzer) (noting the difficult burden of determin-
ing which state officials to hold personally liable).
58. Id.
59. Another inadequacy with an Ex Parte Young suit is the recently added restrictions pro-
nounced in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Federal courts may not now allow Ex
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Several commentators suggest that victims of intellectual prop-
erty infringement may be able to bring an inverse condemnation pro-
ceeding, based in federal law, to receive compensation for the state’s
unlawfully taking their private property.60 Most states’ constitutions’
condemnation clauses provide for payment of just compensation
when the government takes private property for public use.61 These
commentators contend that victims of intellectual property infringe-
ment committed by a state should be able to claim that the state has
committed a taking.62 A full discussion of this notion is beyond the
scope of this Note; here I discuss only why this is not an adequate
remedy.
First, the status of many types of intellectual property rights with
respect to the takings statutes are unclear.63 “There is no case law on
whether intellectual property interests would be governed by inverse
condemnation statutes.”64 Second, relying upon a takings cause of ac-
tion offers the victim only minimal damages. Federal intellectual
property law provides infringement victims with a number of reme-
dies. The Lanham Act,65 the Copyright Act,66 and the Patent Act67
Parte Young actions against a state when a complete, legislatively crafted remedy is already in
existence, see Thomas, supra note 13, at 1088, and state officers cannot be sued to quiet title to
submerged lands, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 429.
60. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Prop-
erty: The Path Left Open After College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
637, 651 (2000) (“[T]he Takings Clause is the strongest available avenue for bringing a claim of
infringement against a state government.”); Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the
Misappropriation of Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before and After
Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 849, 872 (1998) (stating that inverse condemnation proceedings have been initiated when
the state has appropriated an individual’s intellectual property); John O’Connor, Note, Taking
TRIPS to the Eleventh Amendment: The Aftermath of the College Savings Cases, 51 HASTINGS
L.J. 1003, 1017–29 (2000) (describing litigation strategies, including due process eminent domain
claims).
61. 6A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 30.01[2], at 30-10 (3d ed.
2000); Cecily Anne Snyder, Comment, Can the United States Meet Its Obligation to Protect In-
tellectual Property Rights Under the International GATT/TRIPs Agreement After the Florida
Prepaid Cases?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 407, 432 (2001).
 62. See supra note 60.
63. See infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes “property”
under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Heald & Wells, supra note 60, at 855–73 (discuss-
ing the infringement of intellectual property rights as a Fifth Amendment taking).
64. Ghosh, supra note 60, at 663.
65. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
66. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
67. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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provide for injunctions.68 The Lanham Act also provides for conse-
quential, statutory, and treble damages in trademark cases.69 The
Copyright Act provides for consequential and statutory damages in
copyright violation cases,70 and the Patent Act provides for treble
damages for patent infringement.71 By contrast, under takings law, a
plaintiff may not secure injunctive relief,72 consequential damages
(i.e., loss of profits and goodwill),73 or treble damages.74 A third prob-
lem with relying on a takings claim is the forum; takings actions
against state governments must be brought in state courts; whereas
federal courts, which are often a more desirable forum for an injured
plaintiff, are available under federal intellectual property law.75
In sum, neither the Ex Parte Young doctrine nor a inverse con-
demnation proceeding provides an intellectual property infringement
victim with the robust remedies provided for in the intellectual prop-
erty statutes. It therefore is necessary to consider whether a more
promising option is available to Congress.
B. Options Based on Congress’s Spending Power
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has broad
power under the Spending Clause to impose conditions upon the dis-
pensing of federal benefits or gratuities.76 The Spending Clause gives
the federal government power “[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (trademark and unfair competition cases); 17 U.S.C. § 502 (copy-
right cases); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (patent cases).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1117.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 504.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
72. Heald & Wells, supra note 60, at 874.
73. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945) (denying recovery for
future loss of profits, loss of goodwill, and other similar consequential damages).
74. Heald & Wells, supra note 60, at 874; O’Connor, supra note 60, at 1025.
75. Heald & Wells, supra note 60, at 875.
76. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (upholding the conditioning of
federal highway funds on states adopting a legal drinking age of twenty-one); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (upholding a federal program that conditioned receipt of
public works grants upon agreement by the state or local governments that ten percent of the
funds go to minority businesses); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127,
143–44 (1947) (holding that conditioning federal funds on state officers’ not participating in po-
litical activities is a valid use of the spending power); see also Brett D. Proctor, Note, Using the
Spending Power to Circumvent City of Boerne v. Flores: Why the Court Should Require Consti-
tutional Consistency In Its Unconstitutional Conditions Analysis, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 469
(2000) (“Congress’s power to condition its discretionary allocations of funds is remarkably
broad . . . .”).
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Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”77 This clause
gives Congress the authority to legislate on an issue indirectly in a
way that it could not legislate directly.78 The power Congress pos-
sesses under the Spending Clause is contractual in nature: “in return
for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed
conditions.”79 However, as with any contract, the parties have to ac-
cept the terms of the contract voluntarily and knowingly, and when
Congress imposes conditions in exchange for federal gratuities, it
must do so explicitly.80 States receiving the federal benefit must have
notice of the conditions and the consequences if the conditions are
not followed.81
Congress could consider two options based on the spending
power to subject states to suit for their violations of individuals’ in-
tellectual property rights: condition the granting of federal intellec-
tual property protection on states’ waiving their sovereign immunity
in federal court or condition the granting of federal funds on states’
waiving their sovereign immunity. The best alternative available to
Congress is to condition the receipt of federal protection for intellec-
tual property rights owned by the state on states’ waiving their immu-
nity from such suits in federal court.
1. Condition State Participation in the Federal Intellectual
Property System on States’ Waiving Their Sovereign Immunity in
Federal Court. Under the legislation advocated by this Note, a state
will be able to acquire a federal intellectual property right only upon
agreeing to waive its sovereign immunity from suit in federal court in
an action against it arising under federal intellectual property law.82
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
78. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 212 (“Even if Congress might lack the power to impose a
national minimum drinking age directly, we conclude that encouragement to state action . . . is a
valid use of the spending power.”).
79. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
80. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999); Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at
17 (“There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is
unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”).
81. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998).
82. This proposal was suggested by the Copyright Office during congressional hearings and
has some support from most of the experts who testified. See Hearings of State Sovereign Immu-
nity, supra note 4, at 27, 34, 55 (statements of Marybeth Peters, Daniel J. Meltzer, and Mark A.
Lemley). Senator Leahy also introduced it as part of a bill during the 106th Congress. S. 1835,
106th Cong. (1999).
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Authority for such legislation derives from conditional spending
cases. The federal government would be in effect conditioning a
gratuity—the receipt of federal protection for state intellectual
property—on states’ voluntarily waiving their sovereign immunity in
federal court.83 Professor Meltzer skillfully explained the argument
supporting this proposal:
(a) Congress need not create intellectual property rights; (b) thus,
from the states’ standpoint, the property rights they enjoy under
federal IP [Intellectual Property] schemes are gratuities; (c) in dis-
pensing those gratuities, Congress may condition them on a state’s
waiving immunity; (d) and, therefore, Congress may provide that a
state cannot obtain new IP rights unless it agrees to waive immunity
from suit under federal IP schemes.84
Congress is under no obligation to create intellectual property
laws. The wording of the Patent Clause is not obligatory: “The Con-
gress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”85
The Constitution gives Congress the power to create these intellec-
tual property rights but includes no mandate that it do so.86
83. States obtain intellectual property rights for a plethora of inventions, writings, etc. For
example, all inventions from state universities may be patented.
84. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 50 (statement of Daniel J. Melt-
zer).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8.
86. One district court expressly has agreed that the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution does not create an entitlement after the Florida Prepaid decisions were handed
down. The District Court for the Eastern District of California held that the Regents of the
University of California waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity by acquiring a patent un-
der the Patent Act. New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240,
1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686–87 (1999)). The court noted that the Supreme Court in College Savings
Bank “re-affirmed Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission and South Dakota v. Dole,
which held that Congress may require a waiver of State sovereign power as a condition on the
approval of an interstate compact or on the receipt of federal funds.” Id. at 1243 (citations omit-
ted). In New Star Lasers, the plaintiff sued the state to have one of the state’s patents declared
invalid. Id. at 1241. The court rejected the state’s request that the court dismiss the claim on the
grounds of sovereign immunity. Id. at 1242. It reasoned that “a patent constitutes a ‘gift or gra-
tuity’ bestowed by the federal government, and if Congress has conditioned its receipt on a
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity to a declaratory suit, then Congress has acted per-
missibly.” Id. at 1244 (citations omitted).
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Since the 1930s, the Supreme Court consistently has upheld fed-
eral conditioning schemes.87 “No federal appropriations program has
been invalidated by the Supreme Court on federalism-based grounds
since 1936.”88 The Court has been very frank that this power gives the
federal government the ability to carry out its objectives constitution-
ally even when it would not be able to do so directly.89 Many of the
most important government programs today are conditional spending
programs, including Titles VI and IX of the Civil Rights of 197290 and
the Medicaid statute.91 Other examples of conditional spending legis-
lation include the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,92 Title
X of the Public Health Service Act,93 and the Food Security Act.94
Congress validly has attached many different kinds of conditions to
federal highway funds, including raising the drinking age to twenty-
one,95 adhering to a national speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour,96
87. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; infra notes 110–11, 161–66, 174 and accom-
panying text.
88. Proctor, supra note 76, at 469.
89. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (“Even if Congress might lack
the power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly, we conclude that encourage-
ment to state action . . . is a valid use of the spending power.”); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1, 66 (1936) (“[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public
purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”).
90. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999) (“[W]e have re-
peatedly treated Title IX as legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’ authority under the
Spending Clause . . . .”); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998) (“The
two statutes operate in the same manner, conditioning an offer of federal funding on a promise
by the recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the Gov-
ernment and the recipient of funds.”); Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1133 (D. Kan.
2000) (holding that Kansas validly waived its immunity by accepting federal funds under Title
VI, because federal funds are a “gift or gratuity” from the federal government).
91. Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1027 (1999) (noting that Medicaid is a valid use
of the conditional spending power).
92. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(18), 1412(1) (1994) (authorizing federal funds for states on the
condition they provide disabled children with special education and “related services”); see also
Cedar Rapids County Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 68 (1999) (upholding the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act’s condition requiring the provision of “related services”).
93. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 n.4 (1991) (upholding Title X as a conditional
spending measure and holding that funds to states may be conditioned on their not being used
to promote or advocate abortion as a method of family planning).
94. See United States v. Dierckman, 201 F.3d 915, 922 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
Food Security Act validly conditions receipt of United States Department of Agriculture farm
benefits on the preservation of wetlands).
95. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987).
96. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 446 (9th Cir. 1989).
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and prohibiting some state employees from participating in political
management or political campaigns.97
In the leading case, South Dakota v. Dole,98 the Court held that
Congress has the power to condition the receipt of a percentage of
federal highway funds on each state’s raising its drinking age to
twenty-one.99 In this case, the Court laid out a four-part test to deter-
mine whether Congress had properly enacted legislation under the
Spending Clause: (1) the legislation must have been in pursuit of the
general welfare; (2) the condition must have been unambiguous; (3)
the conditions must have been related to the federal interest involved;
and (4) no other constitutional provisions may have provided “an in-
dependent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.”100
The first part of the test, whether the legislation was enacted in
pursuit of the general welfare, is not a meaningful restriction, because
Congress shapes the concept of welfare.101 The courts are required to
defer substantially to Congress with regard to this requirement.102 No
court has struck down spending power legislation based on this fac-
tor.103 The second part of the test is satisfied as long as the statute’s
provisions are very explicit.104 The state has to know exactly what it
will be giving up by accepting the gratuity.
A court need apply only a general rational basis test to satisfy the
third requirement. In analyzing this factor, the court will inquire
whether Congress could have rationally believed that the condition is
related to the federal interest involved.105 In analyzing the fourth fac-
97. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 129 (1947) (noting that
the particular employee in this case was a member of the State Highway Commission).
Brett Proctor, in a note written about the Spending Clause, lists several more examples
of how the spending power could be used to circumvent the Supreme Court’s recent federalism
mandates. Some of these possibilities would seek to reenact provisions of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, which was struck down in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and
the Brady Act, struck down by Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Proctor, supra note
76, at 470.
98. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
99. Id. at 212.
100. Id. at 208.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 207.
103. Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 1103, 1113 (1987).
104. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (holding that the conditions upon which the states “receive
the funds . . . could not be more clearly stated by Congress”).
105. See id. (noting that “the condition imposed by Congress is directly related to one of the
main purposes for which highway funds are expended—safe interstate travel”).
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tor, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the independent consti-
tutional bar factor is not a proscription against indirectly accom-
plishing what Congress could not do directly.106 This factor simply in-
dicates that Congress may not condition funds on states’ performing
unconstitutional activities, such as discriminating or inflicting cruel or
unusual punishment.107
Though it is not technically a component of the four-prong test,
the Dole Court imposed a further restriction on Congress’s power
under the Spending Clause: the condition may not be “so coercive as
to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”108 The
Court has not prescribed any bright-line formula with which to evalu-
ate this factor; it is usually decided on a case-by-case basis.109 The Su-
preme Court has held a federal conditional spending measure to be
coercive only once, in United States v. Butler,110 in 1936.111 However,
the Court “effectively demolished some of the premises of the Butler
case”112 in a case decided only one year later, Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis,113 and never struck down a conditional spending measure on
coercion grounds again.
The conditional waiver scheme should pass this undemanding
test. This legislation would be in pursuit of the general welfare, un-
ambiguous, related to the federal interest involved, and no other con-
stitutional provisions would impose an independent bar. The scheme
also would also pass the coercion test acknowledged in Dole.
Congress established that making all parties, including the states,
amenable to federal intellectual property laws is in the general wel-
fare by passing several different statutes designed to accomplish that
106. Id. at 210.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
109. See Rosenthal, supra note 103, at 1121 (“Where the validity of coercive conditions on
spending has been under consideration, the growing tendency of the Supreme Court has been to
weigh them case by case rather than to try to resolve them by reference to some broad formula-
tion relating to unconstitutional conditions.”).
110. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Incidentally, this case was also the first time the Supreme Court con-
sidered the Spending Clause issue extensively.
111. Rosenthal, supra note 103, at 1127. In Butler, the Court held that Congress could not
condition payments to farmers on their agreeing to curtail acreage or production. 297 U.S. at
74–75.
112. Rosenthal, supra note 103, at 1127.
113. 301 U.S. 548, 583 (1937) (holding that the Social Security Act of 1935, which conditions
a federal gratuity on states’ enacting unemployment compensation laws, is constitutional).
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goal;114 therefore, the first prong of the test should be satisfied easily
by this scheme. The second prong of the Dole test also should not be
difficult to satisfy as long as the bill Congress adopts explicitly details
the terms and consequences of the conditional gratuity measure.
The third prong, requiring that the condition be related to the
federal interest involved, is easily satisfied because the condition and
the gratuity are closely related here. As the Register of Copyrights
notes, “[t]here is a symmetry to this approach.”115
In fact, the relatedness requirement is one advantage this pro-
posal would have over a normal conditional spending scheme involv-
ing federal funds. It is difficult to imagine what kinds of funds Con-
gress could agree to disburse on the condition that states waive their
immunity in intellectual property infringement actions.116 The link be-
tween federal intellectual property rights and states’ waiving their
immunity in such actions seems at least as close as the drinking age–
safe highway travel link approved in Dole. The goals of conditioning
the receipt of federal protection for states’ intellectual property rights
on states’ waiving their immunity and the goals of the federal
intellectual property system itself are identical—to provide for a
uniform, fair system to protect and promote useful works and inven-
tions.
A recent article suggests that a waiver provision of this sort
would have difficulties passing constitutional muster with the Su-
preme Court because of the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine.117
Under this doctrine, a condition imposed by the government must be
germane and not coercive.118 After concluding that the conditional
waiver scheme is not coercive, the article’s author argues that the
waiver provisions are not germane or related closely enough to the
114. See 35 U.S.C. § 296 (1994) (patents); 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994) (trademarks); 17 U.S.C.
§ 511 (1994) (copyrights).
115. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 27 (statement of Marybeth Pe-
ters).
116. See infra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
117. See Cross, supra note 7, at 375 (arguing that conditional waivers are unconstitutional
when the conditions imposed “go too far”). The “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine “holds
that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a con-
stitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.” Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1989). The courts have
held the term “unconstitutional conditions” to encompass “personal liberties of speech, associa-
tion, religion, and privacy.” Id. at 1416. “[C]urrent constitutional law treats most governmental
benefits as ‘gratuities’: matters of political grace to be deferentially reviewed.” Id. at 1424.
118. Cross, supra note 7, at 377–78.
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gratuity.119 The article applies a stricter test than the relatedness prong
test applied in Dole: “[a] connection with the overall legislative pro-
gram will not suffice. Instead, the Court looks for a connection be-
tween the condition and the purposes of the government benefit to
which that condition is attached.”120
Citing Supreme Court precedents from Takings Clause jurispru-
dence121 and a Fourth Circuit case,122 the article concludes that
“whether a State can be liable for copying the work of another has lit-
tle to do with whether it should receive a legal monopoly for other
works that it prepares independently.”123 However, the conditional
waiver scheme much more closely parallels Supreme Court Spending
Clause jurisprudence than Takings Clause jurisprudence. The Court,
in its Spending Clause cases, has consistently applied only a rational
basis standard in judging legislation under the germaneness-
relatedness requirement. The conditional waiver scheme proposed
here more than adequately satisfies the rational basis standard and
has a tighter connection than the article contends. As recently as
1992, the Supreme Court has described this prong of the test as being
satisfied when the condition “bear[s] some relationship to the pur-
pose of the federal spending.”124 The District of Columbia Circuit re-
119. Id. at 378–86. In concluding that the conditions were not overly coercive, the article
reasons that:
[A] condition is coercive only when the benefit to which it is attached is extremely
important to the recipient. Ownership of federal intellectual property rights is not
that crucial to a State. Although . . . intellectual property rights are undoubtedly a
valuable revenue source, a State can always turn to taxes and other funding options.
Moreover, in some cases the State may be able to preserve part of the revenue attrib-
utable to an invention or artistic or literary work in other ways, such as state contract,
trademark, or trade secret laws.
Id. at 378.
120. Id. at 382. The article dismisses several passages from previous opinions that have only
applied a germaneness test to the overall project. See id. at 382 & n.10. Note also that the Su-
preme Court specifically approved these decisions in Dole. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
208 (1987).
121. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (holding that courts must evaluate the
“essential nexus” between “state interest” and a land-use condition); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (holding that land-use regulation is not a taking if it advances
state interests and does not completely deny the owner use of the land). Both of these cases
dealt with the Takings Clause as applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, specifi-
cally with conditions states placed on building permits.
122. See Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 554 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
public university had waived its immunity by accepting Title IX funding and thus agreeing to the
clear condition of waiver Congress attached to the funds).
123. Cross, supra note 7, at 386.
124. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
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jected a stricter test as completely contrary to case law.125 And the Su-
preme Court has given no indication that this prong will be examined
more strictly in the future.126
The last prong of the Dole test requires that there not be any in-
dependent constitutional bar to the conditions. As with the other
Dole factors, this requirement should not be difficult to satisfy. The
Spending Clause power may not be used to coerce states into engag-
ing in unconstitutional pursuits, like cruel or unusual punishment or
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Clearly,
states’ waiving their own immunity is not unconstitutional; therefore,
this prong of the Dole test should not present an obstacle to the con-
ditional waiver scheme.
The Court also may require this conditional waiver plan to pass
the coercion test. Theoretically, if a condition passes the point where
pressure turns into compulsion, then it may be struck down.127 An-
other recent article suggests that a conditional waiver plan of this sort
should fail under this prong.128 The article expresses doubt as to
whether the coercion test applied in Dole is a good one, because its
results are “too arbitrary.”129 The authors reason that, in analyzing
whether the condition was coercive, the Dole Court focused “on the
percentage of federal benefit at stake,” and the conditional waiver
scheme would “withhold federal intellectual property protection from
one hundred percent of a state’s future innovations.”130 Although they
admit it is very difficult to determine how much is “‘too much’ pres-
125. See Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 406–07 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting the notion
that a condition must be precisely related to the purpose of the federal funds that are granted
subject to the condition).
126. Justice O’Connor indicated in her dissent in Dole that she would require a tighter fit
under this prong, but her opinion has never been accepted by a majority of the Court. See South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 215–16 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the differ-
ence turns on whether the condition specifies how the money should be spent).
127. John O’Connor, in a note, argues that a conditional gratuity scheme like that in Senator
Leahy’s Senate Bill 1835 will not pass the coercion test. See O’Connor, supra note 60, at 1043–44
(arguing that the bill will not pass the test due to its punitive measures and its attempt to rede-
fine constitutional rights). However, his cursory examination fails to weigh properly all the facts
and pertinent law. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
128. See Berman et al., supra note 7, at 1151–55 (claiming that the bill probably fails due to
the high percentage of “federal benefits at stake”). Note that although the authors maintain that
this type of bill would not pass constitutional muster, they concede that “it is conceivable that a
majority of the present Court would uphold the bill even while purporting to apply Dole.” Id. at
1147.
129. Id. at 1154.
130. Id. at 1152.
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sure on states,” the authors seem to believe that withholding federal
protection for state intellectual property is “too much.”131
In practice, however, the coercion test has not been a meaningful
obstacle. Several other conditional spending measures with even
more severe conditions have passed constitutional muster. The
Eighth Circuit held that, “[t]he sacrifice of all federal education funds,
approximately $250 million or 12 per cent. of the annual state educa-
tion budget . . . would be politically painful, but we cannot say that it
compels Arkansas’s choice.”132 The antidiscrimination statutes require
the state to waive its sovereign immunity if the state receives federal
funds for any of the listed programs or activities.133 Title VI consis-
tently has been upheld as proper legislation under the Spending
Clause and has never even been challenged for being coercive, even
though it “condition[s] every dollar given to the states on compliance
with federal demands.”134 The Ninth Circuit upheld against a coercion
challenge the federal government’s conditioning of California’s re-
ceipt of Medicaid funds on the state’s providing emergency medical
services to illegal aliens.135
Significant evidence suggests that the coercion test has limited
substance and applicability. As far back as 1937, Justice Cardozo,
writing for the Supreme Court, expressed doubts about the relevance
of this test:
[T]o hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to
plunge the law in endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doc-
trine is the acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which
choice becomes impossible . . . . Nothing in the case suggests the ex-
ertion of a power akin to undue influence, if we assume that such a
concept can ever be applied with fitness to the relations between
state and nation.136
Several appellate court decisions have exhibited similar skepti-
cism about the applicability of the coercion doctrine. For example, in
Nevada v. Skinner,137 the Ninth Circuit expressed doubts over the
131. Id. at 1155.
132. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power) (emphasis added).
133. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198 (1996); Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1081.
134. Proctor, supra note 76, at 490–91, 501.
135. California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997).
136. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937).
137. 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989).
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meaning and relevance of the coercion test and seemed perplexed
about what standards it should apply to discern whether the condition
constituted coercion.138 It stated:
[C]an a sovereign state which is always free to increase its tax reve-
nues ever be coerced by the withholding of federal funds—or is the
state merely presented with hard political choices? The difficulty if
not the impropriety of making judicial judgments regarding a state’s
financial capabilities renders the coercion theory highly suspect as a
method for resolving disputes between federal and state govern-
ments.139
Eight years later, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this dictum from Skinner
and again questioned the viability of the coercion requirement.140 The
Tenth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit have exhibited
similar skepticism over the coercion theory.141 One commentator con-
cludes, “The doctrine of coercion justifiably has no significant appli-
cability in unconstitutional conditions analysis today.”142
However, another author comments that language in College
Savings Bank suggests the Supreme Court may put new bite into the
coercion requirement with regard to state sovereign immunity.143 Near
the end of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia noted that “where the
constitutionally guaranteed protection of the States’ sovereign immu-
nity is involved, the point of coercion is automatically passed—and
the voluntariness of waiver destroyed—when what is attached to the
refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful ac-
tivity.”144
However, the language in this section is ambiguous and must be
read in the context of the language around it. Here, the majority was
discussing constructive waivers, not the kind of waiver scheme pro-
138. Id. at 448.
139. Id. (footnotes omitted).
140. See California v. United States, 104 F.3d at 1092 (questioning whether there is any vi-
ability to the coercion challenge).
141. Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he coercion theory is
unclear, suspect and has little precedent to support its application.”); Oklahoma v. Schweiker,
655 F.2d 401, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The courts are not suited to evaluating whether the states
are faced here with an offer they cannot refuse or merely a hard choice.”).
142. Proctor, supra note 76, at 488–89.
143. See O’Connor, supra note 60, at 1031.
144. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687
(1999).
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posed by this Note.145 Justice Scalia was concluding that constructive
waivers of sovereign immunity are involuntary. In her testimony be-
fore Congress, the Register of Copyrights agreed with this conclusion:
“the better reading of the relevant language is that implied waiver is
inherently involuntary but that where Congress clearly gives the State
a choice, so long as the choice is not coercive, a State’s choice to ex-
plicitly waive its immunity is effective.”146 The Tenth Circuit also has
interpreted Scalia’s passage as applying only to constructive waiv-
ers.147
An author writing after the Florida Prepaid decisions interprets
College Savings Bank as allowing the federal government to “condi-
tion the grant of a patent or trademark to a state agency upon a
waiver of sovereign immunity.”148 The Tenth Circuit recently ob-
served that the “coercion theory” discussed in College Savings Bank
is merely dicta and not controlling.149 The Fifth Circuit added:
The Supreme Court has recognized that the tenth amendment per-
mits Congress to attach conditions to the receipt by the states of
federal funds that have the effect of influencing state legislative
choices. “[T]o hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coer-
cion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties.” This we will not
do.150
In several cases since the Florida Prepaid and College Savings
Bank decisions were handed down, appellate courts expressly have
held that Congress may condition gratuities on states’ waiving their
immunity. In Litman v. George Mason University,151 the conservative
Fourth Circuit held that a public university waived its immunity by
145. Constructive waivers are inexplicit waivers of sovereign immunity. A constructive
waiver occurs, for example, when it is assumed that a state has waived its immunity by accepting
federal funds, or initiating a suit in federal court.
146. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 27 (statement of Marybeth Pe-
ters).
147. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 216 F.3d 929, 937 (10th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a constructive waiver is voluntary only where a gift is denied, not when a sanction
is imposed).
148. Ghosh, supra note 60, at 657.
149. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 216 F.3d at 938–39 n.6.
150. Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 666 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)) (footnotes omitted). A state unquestionably may waive its sov-
ereign immunity by accepting federal funds. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
238 n.1 (1985); Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 493 (11th Cir. 1999); Clark v. California, 123
F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997).
151. 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999).
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accepting Title IX funding, and thus agreed to the clear condition of
waiver Congress attached to the funds.152 The Fifth Circuit came to
the same conclusion in Pederson v. Louisiana State University,153 and
the Eleventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in Sandoval v. Ha-
gan.154
A Seventh Circuit case, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Illi-
nois Bell Telephone Co.,155 decided after Florida Prepaid and College
Savings Bank, effectively illustrates how Congress may condition a
gratuity on states’ waiving their sovereign immunity. The court held
that Congress’s condition that states waive their sovereign immunity
for the benefit of administering regulatory schemes that the federal
government controlled previously was proper under the Eleventh
Amendment.156 The court analogized this scheme to South Dakota v.
Dole:
The state commissions have entered into the same kind of exchange
with Congress that takes place when Congress offers federal funds
conditioned on a state’s acceptance of the federal terms. The only
difference between the classic example of a Spending Clause gratu-
ity of federal funds and the waivers in our cases is that, with the 1996
Telecommunications Act, Congress has offered the states, not fed-
eral funds, but a role as what the carriers have called a “deputized”
federal regulator. In exchange for this grant of regulatory power,
Congress has required the states to agree to submit to federal juris-
diction to review their actions. In Dole, the gratuity was money; the
152. Id. at 556–57. In Litman, the court reasoned that “a state may waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by consenting to be sued in federal court” and that “[p]ermitting such
waivers reflects the fact that sovereign immunity is an element of state sovereignty, not a cate-
gorical limitation on the federal judicial power.” Id. at 550. The court went on to say that
Spending Clause legislation “presents a state with a choice: the state can either comply with cer-
tain congressionally mandated conditions in exchange for federal funds or not comply and de-
cline the funds.” Id. at 552. Because the condition was unambiguous, and the state voluntarily
and knowingly accepted it, the conditional scheme is valid. Id. at 554–55. The Court also ad-
dressed the affect of the Florida Prepaid cases in its conclusion:
[W]e do not read Seminole Tribe and its progeny, including the Supreme Court’s re-
cent Eleventh Amendment decisions, to preclude Congress from conditioning federal
grants on a state’s consent to be sued in federal court to enforce the substantive con-
ditions of the federal spending program. Indeed, to do so would affront the Court’s
acknowledgement in Seminole Tribe of “the unremarkable . . . proposition that States
may waive their sovereign immunity.”
Id. at 556 (quoting Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996)).
153. 213 F.3d 858, 875–76 (5th Cir. 2000).
154. 197 F.3d 484, 492–94 (11th Cir. 1999).
155. 222 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2000).
156. Id. at 343–44.
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condition was a higher drinking age. Here, the gratuity is federal
regulatory power; the condition is waiver of the state’s immunity.157
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also can be analogized to the
conditional waiver scheme. Federal intellectual property rights, like
the regulation of local phone service, are federal gratuities. Another
analogy can be made to federal bankruptcy claims. The Tenth Circuit
recently held that states must waive their sovereign immunity in
bankruptcy claims as a condition to participation in the federal Per-
kins student loan programs.158
One could argue that because of the Supreme Court’s recent in-
vigoration of federalism limits on congressional power, the Dole test
will be revised in the near future to establish a much stricter test. Al-
though it is certainly true that certain areas of expansive federal
regulation, most noticeably in the area of the Commerce Clause, have
been drastically curtailed in the last decade,159 there is no reason to
believe that the Supreme Court will change its Spending Clause juris-
prudence anytime in the near future.160
The court consistently and recently has upheld spending power
legislation against states’ rights challenges. Less than ten years ago, in
New York v. United States,161 the Court held that Congress could
achieve indirectly through the Spending Clause some actions against
a state that it could not constitutionally pursue directly.162 This case
157. Id. (footnote omitted); accord MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 216 F.3d
929, 937–39 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 “transformed
the regulation of local phone service from an otherwise permissible state activity into a federal
gratuity,” and that the state validly waived its immunity by arbitrating a dispute for a local
phone service) (footnotes omitted); AT&T Communications, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
86 F. Supp. 2d 932, 947 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (holding that the Telecommunications Act does im-
pose obligations on the state if the state chooses to be the arbiter of disputes).
158. In re Innes, 184 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000);
Federal Perkins Loan Program, 34 C.F.R. § 674 (2000).
159. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (analyzing the expansion of state governments’
power at the expense of the federal government).
160. In an article written for a recent Spending Clause symposium in the Chapman Law Re-
view, an author supporting a much weaker Spending Clause power for the federal government
admits this proposition is true. “Thus far, the Supreme Court has not given any signal to suggest
that it would apply its federalism rulings in the Spending Clause context, and the last major
precedent on the subject strongly suggests that it would not.” John C. Eastman, Restoring the
“General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 64 (2001) (citing South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
161. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
162. Id. at 167 (holding that under Congress’s spending power, Congress can attach condi-
tions to receiving funds).
COTNER.DOC 01/25/02  3:22 PM
2001] STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 737
arose as a challenge by a state to provisions in the federal Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act.163 While explicitly upholding the condi-
tional spending portion of the Act, the Court struck down other por-
tions of the Act that required states to accept ownership of waste, or
else regulate according to congressional instructions, as a violation of
state sovereignty.164 Justice O’Connor, in her majority opinion, rea-
soned that the spending power is altogether different from the com-
merce power in its effect upon the sovereignty of the states.165 The
Court also has recently affirmed the Dole test in Alden v. Maine166 and
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise.167
The conditional spending and gratuity cases can be distinguished
from other cases in which the Court has struck down federal schemes
on federalism grounds, such as United States v. Lopez168 or United
States v. Morrison.169 “In [those cases], the contention was that Con-
gress had taken some action that was not within the scope of its enu-
merated powers. In Dole, by contrast, no one questioned the author-
ity of Congress to spend funds for highway construction.”170 Similarly,
the federal government has discretion to use its powers to protect the
intellectual property rights of its citizens and states.171
Some of these federalism decisions have used the Tenth
Amendment to restrict the powers of the federal government.172
However, the Dole Court held that the Tenth Amendment is not an
independent constitutional bar to conditional spending measures. It
pointed out that “a perceived Tenth Amendment limitation on con-
163. Id. at 149.
164. Id. at 173, 177.
165. Id. at 167 (noting that Congress has power to encourage a state to regulate in a par-
ticular way through either the conditional spending power or under the Commerce Clause by
offering a state the choice of regulating in accordance with federal standards or having the laws
preempted).
166. 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (“Nor, subject to constitutional limitations, does the Federal
Government lack the authority or means to seek the States’ voluntary consent to private
suits.”).
167. 501 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1991).
168. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
169. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
170. Earl M. Maltz, Sovereignty, Autonomy and Conditional Spending, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 107,
113 (2001).
171. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
172. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress may not
conscript state officers directly to enforce regulation); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
168 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot compel states to enforce a regulatory program).
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gressional regulation of state affairs did not concomitantly limit the
range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants.”173 The Su-
preme Court repeatedly has rebuffed challenges to the federal gov-
ernment’s power under the Spending Clause as a violation of state
immunity and sovereignty.174
Furthermore, although Justice O’Connor expressed some con-
sternation over the laxity of the relatedness requirement of the Dole
test,175 a majority of the Court today would likely consider this test
good law. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in Dole and
was joined by Justices Stevens and Scalia.176 It also seems very likely
that the more liberal members of the Court, Justices Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer, would be especially likely to uphold a conditional
waiver scheme, judging from the consternation expressed in their dis-
sent in the Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank decisions. Jus-
tices Kennedy, Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas all have af-
firmed the Dole test recently.177 Although of course one could not
173. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987).
174. For instance, in Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127
(1947), the Court rejected a claim by the state that the penalty provisions of its conditional grant
agreement with the federal government were unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment. Id.
at 143 (holding that as a condition of a grant of federal funds for highway construction, the state
officers managing these funds may be required to desist from participating in some forms of par-
tisan politics). Providing for the termination of a state officer for noncompliance with a federal
grant agreement does not infringe on state sovereign immunity. Id. The Supreme Court also has
held that conditioning federal funding on the achievement of milestones under the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Act was not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. at 173. The Ninth Circuit rejected a similar Tenth Amendment challenge in Cali-
fornia v. United States, 104 F.3d 1986 (9th Cir. 1997), upholding a federal scheme that condi-
tioned the receipt of Medicaid funds on the state’s providing emergency medical care to illegal
aliens. Id. at 1092–93.
175. Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Dole centered on her disagreement with the Court’s ap-
plication of the third prong of the test, the relatedness requirement. Although the Court applied
only a reasonableness standard, Justice O’Connor would require a tighter fit. She wrote that
“[t]he difference turns on whether the requirement specifies in some way how the money should
be spent . . . Congress has no power under the Spending Clause to impose requirements on a
grant that go beyond specifying how the money should be spent.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 216
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). This interpretation of the relatedness requirement has never been
accepted by a majority of the Court.
176. These Justices rarely agree on federalism questions, thus suggesting broad support for
the Dole spending test. Also note that Justice Rehnquist was the author of several federalism
decisions that have greatly constricted federal power, including Florida Prepaid Post Secondary
Educational Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), and United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
177. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (noting that “the Federal Government
[does not] lack the authority or means to seek the States’ voluntary consent to private suits”);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 145 (“As relevant here, Congress may, under its spending
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guarantee these Justices would vote as predicted, a majority of the
Justices likely would uphold the test.
Even if the Court decided to put more bite in the coercion re-
quirement, this scheme still would likely pass scrutiny. Although a
state would have to forgo protection for all of its own intellectual
property, it is unlikely that would constitute a serious act of coercion
of the state. Intellectual property rights owned by a state generate
significant revenue, but taking them away would not prevent the state
from obtaining revenue from other sources, such as increased taxa-
tion. The Court dismissed the $100 million condition in South Dakota
v. Dole without much discussion.178 Also, the federal government vol-
untarily forgoes copyright protection for works produced by federal
employees in the scope of their employment,179 and it has not experi-
enced visibly harsh economic side effects as a result.
A well-respected federalism scholar has recently written an arti-
cle arguing that “the spending power is different and should not be
constrained by the Tenth or Eleventh Amendment or construed nar-
rowly as the Court has done with the commerce power and section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”180 He further distinguishes the other
federalism cases by noting that:
[N]o limits on the scope of the spending power can be reasonably in-
ferred from the text of the Constitution. The commerce power limits
Congress to regulating commerce “among the states” and section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment constricts Congress to adopting laws
“to enforce” that amendment. . . . Quite the contrary, the spending
power authorizes Congress to tax and spend to “provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” It is
hard to imagine a broader statement of the scope of Congress’
power.181
power, attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, so long as such conditions meet four
requirements.”); see also Proctor, supra note 76, at 470 (quoting Justice O’Connor in New York
v. United States as noting that “‘short of outright coercion . . . Congress may urge a State to
adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests’” in suggesting that the Brady Act
might be saved by conditioning federal grants on state compliance).
178. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1994).
180. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 90 (2001).
181. Id. at 93. In providing further support for his thesis, Chemerinsky also cites National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998), and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
193–94 (1991), as cases in other contexts in which the Court has “consistently reaffirmed the
power of the federal government to choose what to fund by placing conditions on the money.”
Chemerinsky, supra note 180, at 96–97. In Finley, the Court held that the National Endowment
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In a way, the Spending Clause is enticing for even the most ar-
dent states’ rights supporters. It gives Congress a chance to legislate
on important issues without compromising the states’ integrity; it does
not compel any state action. Such a scheme gives the states a choice to
perform some action in return for some gift or gratuity. States retain
their sovereign right to make agreements with other sovereigns; they
are “equal partners in a freely bargained relationship.”182 Ultimately,
“conditioning federal funds on an explicit state waiver of sovereign
immunity does not violate bedrock principles of federalism.”183
The conditional waiver scheme is the logical continuation of a
line of cases granting Congress broad power to set conditions for
states to receive certain gratuities. No precedent suggests this scheme
would be interpreted any differently. Congress has the authority to
induce states to waive their sovereign immunity in federal court. In-
tellectual property rights are “gratuities” to the state, because they
are not mandated by the Constitution. Therefore, Congress has the
power to make the receipt of federal intellectual property protection
contingent upon states’ waiving their immunity in such cases.
2. Condition Federal Funds on States’ Waiving their Sovereign
Immunity. Congress has the option of conditioning federal funds on
states’ waiving their sovereign immunity in federal court. This option
is based on Congress’s power under the Spending Clause, and oper-
ates in a fashion similar to the option described in Part III.B.1. In-
stead of conditioning federal participation in the federal intellectual
property system on states’ waiving their immunity in federal court,
Congress would condition federal funding that relates to intellectual
property.
Although a conditional funding plan would be constitutional, it
may be less effective than a conditional waiver bill because of the re-
latedness requirement. The Register of Copyrights noted that copy-
rights, patents, and trademarks do not relate as easily to federal
spending as driving and highway funds.184 Congress could condition
for the Arts could consider decency and values in screening which pieces of art to fund. 524 U.S.
at 588. In Rust, the Court held that Congress constitutionally could condition federal funds on
Planned Parenthood’s not providing any information about abortion or referring patients to
doctors for abortions. 500 U.S. at 193–94.
182. Maltz, supra note 170, at 112.
183. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 494 (11th Cir. 1999).
184. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 25 & n.64 (statement of Mary-
beth Peters).
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federal funds for state universities on their waiver of their right to
immunity from suit. State universities have been one of the main
sources of private intellectual property infringement. However, tying
a waiver of immunity to federal spending for higher education is
problematic; there would be political tensions and such a system
could wind up unfairly penalizing institutions of higher learning if
their state legislatures refuse to waive their immunity.185 It also would
cover only some of the states’ infringements; many victims would be
left unprotected.
The relatedness requirement also may create difficulties in its
implementation. A conditional scenario based on federal funding
would raise questions, such as: “[C]an Congress condition the grant of
funds for scientific research on waiver for suit for all intellectual
property claims or just ones stemming from patent?”186 Still, another
disadvantage is that this option may require a congressional appro-
priations committee to reenact this legislation every year.187
Overall, although this method certainly has promise, the condi-
tional gratuity plan probably would be more effective at obtaining
proper remedies for victims of state intellectual property infringe-
ment.188 Other options Congress may consider are even less effective,
however, and may be unconstitutional as well.
185. Id. at 25.
186. Ghosh, supra note 60, at 658.
187. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 25 (statement of Marybeth Pe-
ters).
188. One commentator suggests another approach to sidestepping the Florida Prepaid and
College Savings Bank decisions. The approach would work as follows: “Congress merely refuses
to recognize future state intellectual property rights until such time as that particular state
waives its sovereign immunity to suit for intellectual right infringement.” O’Connor, supra note
60, at 1041. The major difference between this proposal and the conditional gratuity scheme is
procedural. While the conditional gratuity scheme would have states “opting into” the federal
intellectual property program and consequences ensuing if they claim immunity in any in-
fringement suits, the quid pro quo solution would have Congress merely refusing to recognize
any future rights if the state does not waive its immunity.
There are several reasons why the conditional gratuity plan is superior. The link be-
tween the quid pro quo scheme and the Spending Clause cases is more tenuous. The author of
this scheme says it “depends on the unique features of the intellectual property system, and the
fact that both states and private citizens are participants in the federal intellectual property sys-
tem.” Id. at 1040. The conditional gratuity plan also is more extensive than O’Connor’s scheme
and would provide more effective protection and remedies for victims of intellectual property
right infringement.
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C. Unsatisfactory Proposals to Remedy State Immunity
Congress could consider several other options not based on the
Spending Clause: (1) pass a constitutional amendment; (2) amend the
intellectual property acts to permit suits against states in state courts;
(3) empower a federal agency to bring actions against states for vio-
lating the intellectual property rights of private parties; or (4) enact
more narrowly tailored legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, as this Note demonstrates, none of these pos-
sibilities will both adequately protect the interests of victims of state-
actor infringement and pass constitutional muster with the present
Supreme Court.
1. Pass a Constitutional Amendment to Make States Liable for
Infringement. Senator Arlen Specter, a Republican from Pennsylva-
nia, has suggested that “a constitutional amendment is the only way
to reinstate the balance between the authority of the Congress and
the usurpation by the Supreme Court.”189 The Senator rejects the pos-
sibility that Congress could adopt legislation that would pass the City
of Boerne test for legislation enacted under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.190 Although it may be true that Congress will not
be able to tailor legislation to fit the City of Boerne test, Senator
Specter probably did not give enough consideration to other possibili-
ties Congress could consider. Constitutional amendments are ex-
tremely difficult to pass in the United States.191 Even if Congress ap-
proves a new amendment, three-fourths of the states must ratify it.192
Therefore, the states remain largely in control of the amendment pro-
cess,193 and they are no more likely to support an amendment than
waive their sovereign immunity.
189. 149 CONG. REC. S10361 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen. Specter).
190. See id. (“Given the intensity of the Court’s agenda and its inventive and extreme ra-
tionales for declaring Congressional actions unconstitutional, it is highly doubtful that anything
the Congress does will satisfy the Court in its current campaign.”).
191. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding and Consti-
tutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 144 (1996) (noting that, although it is less rigid
than the amendment system under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers intentionally cre-
ated a very difficult process).
192. U.S. CONST. art. V.
193. Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional
Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 258–59 (1996) (“[T]he American model re-
quires that the states, rather than the national legislature or the American people as a nation,
must ultimately agree to a modification of the [Constitution].”).
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2. Amend the Intellectual Property Acts to Permit Suits Against
States in State Courts. One option the Copyright Office considered in
response to the Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank decisions
was to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) to permit suits against states in
their own courts.194 However, patent and copyright infringements are
exclusively federal causes of action, and trademark infringement is
substantially federal; therefore, barring individuals from suing the
state in federal court is virtually a bar to any relief at all and contra-
venes the intent of Congress. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s rea-
soning in Florida Prepaid,195 Congress found that state remedies were
largely inadequate to deal with intellectual property infringement.196
In fact, the Copyright Act and Patent Act largely preempt state
remedies.197 Generally, state remedies are considerably weaker than
the remedies provided for in federal statutes.
Furthermore, this option seems like a clear non-starter after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Alden v. Maine,198 holding that a state’s
right to claim sovereign immunity in state court is effectively equiva-
lent to its right to claim immunity in federal court.199 Permitting suits
in state courts would be viable only if the states voluntarily waive
their immunity in state courts. Thus, permitting suits in state courts
appears to be no more effective than inaction. The federal govern-
ment has no more leverage to make the states receptive to suit in
state courts than in federal courts, and all things being equal, federal
194. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 24 (statement of Marybeth Pe-
ters). The district courts have original jurisdiction in civil actions relating to federal patent, plant
variety protection, copyright, and trademark law, and their jurisdiction is exclusive in the case of
patent, plant variety protection, and copyright cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).
195. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 628
(1999) (finding that Congress did not sufficiently consider whether the state remedies were con-
stitutionally adequate).
196. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-960, at 37 (1990) (citing the drawbacks of withdrawing the
federal forum for intellectual property actions and of plaintiffs’ not receiving any money dam-
ages from the states for copyright infringement and concluding that the states’ sovereign immu-
nity must be abrogated to ensure infringees received proper remedies).
197. The Copyright Act explicitly preempts state law. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994); see also Hear-
ings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 24 (statement of Marybeth Peters) (noting
that copyright law largely preempts state law). Although the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.
(1994), does not contain an explicit preemption provision, courts consistently have held that
federal patent law preempts conflicting state law. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964); Mars, Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha
Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
198. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
199. Id. at 709–10.
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court is the preferred forum for intellectual property suits. Congress
gave the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear these suits to
promote uniformity and greater expertise in the judiciary with respect
to intellectual property law.200
3. Empower a Federal Agency to Bring Actions Against States
for Violating Intellectual Property Rights of Private Parties. Another
option available to Congress to overcome state immunity is to sanc-
tion a suit by the United States via a federal agency on behalf of vic-
tims of state-actor infringement.201 States have no immunity from suit
by the United States.202 The United States may bring suit to enforce
federal law regardless of whether it has a proprietary interest in the
outcome.203 Congress used a similar approach in, for example,
authorizing the Department of Labor to enforce the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act.204
However, significant resource problems accompany this method,
and there seems to be little advantage to this approach over the cur-
rent system. Some of the participants in recent congressional hearings
expressed doubt whether this scheme would be constitutional, espe-
cially in view of the Supreme Court’s present stance on states’ rights
and sovereign immunity.205 Even though a state actor is responsible
200. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994) (giving district courts original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, and
trademarks); see also Ghosh, supra note 60, at 653 (“The chief problem with creating concurrent
jurisdiction is uniformity of law.”).
201. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 25 (statement of Marybeth Pe-
ters).
202. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996) (noting this lack of immunity
as a method of ensuring a state’s compliance with federal law); United States v. Mississippi, 380
U.S. 128, 140 (1965) (“While [the Eleventh Amendment] has been read to bar a suit by a State’s
own citizen . . . nothing in this or any other provision of the Constitution prevents or has ever
been seriously supposed to prevent a State’s being sued by the United States.”); United States v.
Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644–45 (1892) (finding the absence of state immunity to suit by the United
States necessary to the “permanence of the Union”).
203. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960) (holding that Congress may author-
ize the United States to sue to enforce constitutional provisions); see also United States v. Cali-
fornia, 297 U.S. 175, 180 (1936) (discussing the authority of the United States to sue a state un-
der the Federal Safety Appliance Act in order to collect a civil penalty).
204. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 46 (statement of Daniel J. Melt-
zer).
205. See id. at 26 (statement of Marybeth Peters) (“It is uncertain whether the Federal Gov-
ernment could succeed in championing the cases of individuals where states could not. How-
ever, these decisions cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of this option.”); id. at 46
(statement of Daniel J. Meltzer).
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for violating federal law, the Court and Congress may find this to be
an insufficient justification for public enforcement.206 Furthermore,
agencies usually have to get their funding renewed every year,207 and
the funding would have to be considerable for the federal government
to initiate a large number of lawsuits.
The Register of Copyrights also has expressed concerns about
the efficacy of this method over simple Ex Parte Young suits brought
by individual infringement victims: “Unless a structure can be devised
whereby the federal agency can obtain damages for past infringe-
ments and turn them over to copyright owners, it is difficult to see any
advantage to enforcement by a federal agency that cannot already be
obtained under Ex Parte Young.”208 In congressional hearings, the
Register mentioned that this method might have been possible in the
form of qui tam suits, where an individual is authorized to pursue a
right of action of the federal government.209 However, the Supreme
Court has recently expressed the notion that the Eleventh Amend-
ment may bar qui tam suits against states.210 Justice Scalia noted that
the majority has “serious doubt” about the constitutionality of qui
tam suits against states in federal courts.211
4. Enact More Narrowly Tailored Legislation Under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress still retains the power to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity by using Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.212 However, the test for abrogating state immunity in
206. Id. at 46 (statement of Daniel J. Meltzer).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 25 (statement of Marybeth Peters).
209. Id.
210. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787
(2000) (holding that the False Claims Act (FCA) did not subject a state to qui tam liability, be-
cause the term “person” in the FCA did not include states for the purposes of qui tam liability).
211. Id. at 787.
212. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
636–37 (1999) (“‘[A]ppropriate legislation pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment [can] abrogate state sovereignty.”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
74 (1996) (“[W]here Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement
against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those
limitations and permitting an action against a staff officer . . . .”); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1976) (“Congress may, in determining what is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose
of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against
States or State officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.”).
Early cases made it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to be a direct
limitation on the states’ power. See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879). The Supreme
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this manner is very rigid under City of Boerne v. Flores.213 To deter-
mine whether an act is constitutional under this test, one should ask
whether there is “a congruence and proportionality between the in-
jury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.”214 This decision drastically contracted Congress’s power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.215 The Court maintained
that these limitations on the Fourteenth Amendment are necessary to
prevent it “from obliterating the Framers’ carefully crafted balance of
power between the States and the National Government.”216
In fact, the Supreme Court has struck down legislation in
every case in which it has applied the City of Boerne test since the de-
cision was handed down. For instance, in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents,217 the Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it at-
tempted to abrogate the states’ immunity in Age Discrimination in
Employment Act suits.218 Federal courts of appeals have been simi-
larly reticent about permitting congressional abrogation of state sov-
ereign immunity. They have invalidated abrogation attempts under
the Copyright Act,219 the Americans with Disabilities Act,220 the Fam-
Court pronounced in this case that the contemplated federal “legislation is restrictive of what
the State might have done before the constitutional amendment was adopted.” Id. Because the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to confine the states’ powers, Congress may constitution-
ally abrogate state sovereign immunity under this amendment.
213. 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
214. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
215. Rachel Toker, Tying the Hands of Congress—City of Boerne v. Flores, 33 HARV. C.R.–
C.L. L. REV. 273, 273 (1998).
216. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000).
217. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
218. Id. at 91; see also Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373
(2001) (holding Congress exceeded its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
by abrogating the states’ immunity from suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
219. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 608 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that
the statutory abrogation of a state’s immunity—allowing an author to seek damages for alleged
copyright infringement—was not a proper exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause).
220. See, e.g., Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a federal
regulation promulgated pursuant to the ADA, which prohibited Texas from imposing a fee for
handicapped parking placards, did not validly abrogate the state’s immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment); Stevens v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 210 F.3d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that the Illinois Department of Transportation is immune to suit brought by an individual
under the ADA).
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ily Medical Leave Act of 1993,221 and various environmental stat-
utes.222
In Florida Prepaid, the Supreme Court held that the Patent
Remedy Act was not properly enacted under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.223 The Court held that the Act, by permitting a
federal patent infringement remedy without regard to the existence of
an adequate state post-deprivation remedy, did not respond to a con-
stitutional violation.224 The Court continued by noting that, “[i]nstead,
Congress appears to have enacted this legislation in response to a
handful of instances of state patent infringement that do not neces-
sarily violate the Constitution.”225
Professor Shubha Ghosh asserts that a Section 5 solution “is very
powerful and will undoubtedly be the source for Congress’ attempt to
statutorily reverse the Court’s decision in [Florida Prepaid].”226 Al-
though theoretically possible, it would be extremely difficult for Con-
gress to tailor the Patent Remedy Act narrowly enough to pass the
Court’s “congruence and proportionality” test for the same reasons
that the Florida Prepaid Court struck down the Act in the first
place.227
Congress would have to establish a much more extensive record
of state-actor infringement than what it presented to the Florida Pre-
paid Court to establish that Congress was attempting to remedy wide-
spread constitutional violations. A constitutional violation occurs only
when a state provides inadequate or no remedies when it infringes on
a property owner’s rights without due process. The Florida Prepaid
Court was dissatisfied with the record Congress compiled during the
221. See, e.g., Chittister v. Dep’t of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2000)
(stating that “the FMLA [Family Medical Leave Act] provisions at issue here do not represent a
valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and that the FMLA
does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity”).
222. See, e.g., Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the citizen
suit provisions of the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act did not abrogate
state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, but rather were expressly limited by
it).
223. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647
(1999). For a longer description of the holding of Florida Prepaid, see supra notes 26–40 and
accompanying text.
224. Id. at 645–46.
225. Id.
226. Ghosh, supra note 60, at 659.
227. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
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passage of the Patent Remedy Act,228 and that probably would not
change unless many state immunity claims were suddenly raised to
create such a record.
Also, it is worth noting that extensive findings in and of them-
selves will not sustain legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, in United States v. Morrison,229 the Su-
preme Court struck down portions of the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA) despite admitting that the Section 5 claim was “sup-
ported by a voluminous congressional record.”230 Although some
would agree that a constitutional violation has been established when
states infringe on intellectual property rights, the Supreme Court dis-
agrees, and there is no reason to believe it will change that perception
in the foreseeable future.
Even if Congress could tailor legislation narrowly enough to sat-
isfy the test, the legislation most likely would be too weak to provide
an adequate remedy to victims of state-actor infringement. The legis-
lation would have to be directed at situations in which an adequate
state remedy does not exist or is highly questionable, and Congress
would have to make extensive findings to that effect.231 Professor
Meltzer, in his testimony before Congress, suggested that Congress
could provide a cause of action against states that intentionally de-
prive individuals of their intellectual property rights when the state
does not provide an adequate remedy.232 Under this scheme, when a
state actor intentionally infringes a person or entity’s intellectual
property rights, the victim could sue the state or its officials in state
court if the remedy is adequate; if it is not adequate, the party could
allege a constitutional violation and bring a suit in federal court under
this statute.233
There are several problems with this scheme from the perspec-
tive of the infringement victim, however. Many state-actor infringe-
ments are not intentional and therefore not covered by the statute.
228. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640.
229. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
230. Id. at 620.
231. Language in Senate Bill 1835, see supra note 8, has attempted to tailor the legislation
extremely narrowly to fit the parameters of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. However, for
reasons discussed in the remainder of this Note, such a bill would not be effective at protecting
victims of state-actor intellectual property infringement.
232. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 40 (statement of Daniel J. Melt-
zer).
233. Id.
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Also, the definition of “intentional” in the case law is unclear.234 Fur-
thermore, many states do not provide adequate causes of action for
victims of state-actor infringement. Intellectual property rights have
been a purely federal cause of action, and few state laws cover this
kind of harm.235
The Court has not even expressly established what kind of rem-
edy is “adequate” for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.236
A state must violate the Fourteenth Amendment for Congress to be
able to use its enforcement power. The state must either provide no
remedy or a constitutionally “inadequate” remedy to infringement
victims for it to be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.237 The Court in Florida Prepaid did not specifi-
cally discuss what would constitute an “adequate” state remedy.
The Supreme Court generally treats “adequacy” as a constitu-
tional standard, and the Constitution does not seem to require as ex-
pansive a remedy as that provided by the federal intellectual property
statutes.238 An “adequate” remedy may include only a rehearing be-
fore some authority that can provide redress,239 and a remedy may be
“adequate” even if it provides no punitive damages or attorney’s
fees.240 The courts have split over whether providing only for injunc-
tive relief is “adequate.”241 Whatever the exact standard by which an
234. Id. at 40–41.
235. Id. at 41.
236. Id. at 41–42.
237. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643
(1999); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532–33 (1984); see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
541 (1981) (noting that the state cannot take property without providing a “meaningful” post-
deprivation hearing but that “prior cases have excused a prior-hearing requirement on the
availability of some meaningful opportunity subsequent to the initial taking” to determine rights
and liabilities).
238. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 42 (statement of Daniel J. Melt-
zer) (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543–44).
239. Williams v. St. Louis County, 812 F.2d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 1987).
240. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543–44 (“Although the state remedies may not provide the re-
spondent with all the relief which may have been available if he could have proceeded under
§ 1983, that does not mean that the state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements
of due process.”). Note that the federal intellectual property laws do provide for full costs and
attorney’s fees and treble damages in some situations. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994) (provid-
ing for full costs and attorney’s fees in copyright infringement actions); 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–285
(1994) (providing for injunctive relief, treble damages, and attorney’s fees in patent infringe-
ment actions); see also Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 774 F. Supp. 1277, 1286 (D. Colo. 1991) (“As
with trebled damages, an award of attorney fees is within the discretion of the court.”).
241. Compare Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 1459 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding
that state remedies that completely bar any prospect of monetary recovery because of sovereign
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“adequate” remedy is to be measured, it very likely would be far less
generous to a victim of infringement than the federal statutory rem-
edy would be.
Even if states did provide an adequate cause of action, enforcing
intellectual property laws at the state level would undermine key as-
pects of the federal intellectual property system. The enforcement of
intellectual property rights is best achieved if its application is uni-
form, and state court judges are not experts on these issues. To fur-
ther this uniformity and judicial expertise, Congress created a single
court of appeals for patent cases, the Federal Circuit.242
Enacting legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment would
encounter the additional problem of ascertaining exactly what kinds
of intellectual property rights are property in the constitutional sense.
Patents are considered property,243 and trade secrets are also generally
considered property within the meaning of the Fifth and presumably
the Fourteenth Amendments.244 In College Savings Bank,245 the Su-
preme Court held that rights against false advertising do not consti-
tute property.246 The status of other types of intellectual property is
unclear.
One additional problem with an abrogation statute of this kind is
that Congress probably cannot identify a widespread pattern of con-
stitutional violations by the states.247 In Florida Prepaid, the Court
failed to find such a pattern. However, Professor Daniel J. Meltzer
explained to Congress his belief that this problem does not necessar-
ily doom this hypothetical statute because this “measure is more eas-
ily viewed as ‘remedial,’ and the validity of a statute limited to regu-
immunity are adequate), with Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1523 n.6 (1st Cir. 1983)
(holding that such a remedy is not adequate).
242. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994) (stating that the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals from the district court level arising under the federal patent statute).
243. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642
(1999) (“[P]atents may be considered ‘property’ for purposes of our analysis . . . .”); Brown v.
Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 197 (1856) (“For, by the laws of the United States, the rights
of a party under a patent are his private property . . . .”).
244. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (holding that trade se-
crets, though intangible, have characteristics of more traditional forms of property and are
therefore protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
245. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
246. Id. at 670–72.
247. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90–91 (2000) (“[I]t is sufficient for the
cases to note that Congress failed to identify a widespread pattern of age discrimination by the
States.”); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 644 (“‘[T]he availability of a State remedy is tenuous and
could vary significantly State to State.’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-960, at 37 n. 158 (1990)).
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lating unconstitutional conduct itself should not require an additional
showing of widespread violations by the states.”248
The most important consideration in assessing enforcement
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment does seem to be whether
the measure is remedial. However, the Court repeatedly has asked
whether there is a widespread pattern of constitutional violations in
determining whether legislation enacted under Section 5 is congruent
and proportional, including in Florida Prepaid.249 Although looking
for a pattern of constitutional violations may not entail a rigid analy-
sis that needs to be satisfied separately from the “congruence and
proportionality” test, it provides important insight into what the
Court will require to meet the test. It does not appear likely that the
Patent Remedy Act, even if amended, could pass this examination.
Another attempt by Congress to abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity using Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would probably
prove to be futile, at least in the immediate future. Even if Congress
could draft legislation to surmount the hurdles established in these
cases, it most likely would be unsuccessful at obtaining for victims of
intellectual property infringement the remedies they deserve.
CONCLUSION
Congress should adopt the conditional waiver plan advocated by
this Note to circumvent the Supreme Court’s decisions in Florida
Prepaid and College Savings Bank. Although there may be legitimate
reasons for the states to have immunity from suit in certain contexts,
state immunity serves no compelling interest in intellectual property
infringement suits. The states’ interest in sovereign immunity seems
meager compared to the interests of the victims with no suitable rem-
edy. Inverse condemnation and Ex Parte Young suits provide inade-
quate remedies for infringement claimants, and the present system is
unlikely to be altered by a constitutional amendment.
248. Hearings on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 43 (statement of Daniel J. Melt-
zer).
249. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645 (“The legislative record thus suggests that the Patent
Remedy Act does not respond to a history of ‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitu-
tional rights’ of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation.”)
(citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)); see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (“Con-
gress’ failure to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination here confirms
that Congress had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was necessary in this
field.”).
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It seems highly improbable Congress will be able to pass legisla-
tion under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment after the virtually
insurmountable test announced in City of Boerne. Even if it could, the
legislation probably would be too diluted to be effective. Empowering
a federal agency to sue states for intellectual property infringement is
of dubious constitutionality and efficacy, and amending the intellec-
tual property acts to permit suits against states in state courts appears
similarly unlikely to be effective in obtaining suitable remedies for
victims of state-actor intellectual property infringement.
The best solution is to condition the gratuity of participation in
the federal intellectual property system on states’ waiving their im-
munity in the traditional federal court forum. There is a strong body
of case law to suggest this approach would pass constitutional muster,
even with the current Supreme Court Justices, and it would be very
effective at obtaining extensive remedies for the infringement victims.
It also has the added policy benefit of saving face both for the states
and for the Supreme Court. It allows the federal government to leg-
islate on this very important issue without diverging from precedent
or intruding unnecessarily on the power of the state governments.
